Following the setting aside of the 2022/23 red rock lobster total allowable catch (TAC) decisions by Churchman J in November 2022, the Minister for Oceans and Fisheries (the Minister) issued a revised TAC decision in March 2023 of reducing the total allowable catch for Northland quota management area (CRA1) by approximately 11% and decreasing the commercial allocation from 105 to 89 tonnes, in an attempt to address the defects identified in the earlier judgment. The Environmental Law Initiative and Dallas Williams on behalf of the Ngāti Hau and Ngāti Kaharau Hapū ki Hokianga filed an application for judicial review of the 2023 TAC decision by the Minister under s 13 of the Fisheries Act 1996. The applicable law in this case is the Fisheries Act 1996.The cases cited in this case included Environmental Law Initiative v Minister for Oceans and Fisheries NZHC 2969; Air Nelson v Minister of Transport NZCA 26, NZAR 139; and Seafood New Zealand Ltd v Royal Forest & Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc NZSC 111, 1 NZLR 511.

The Minister is responsible for setting the TAC for each fishery, aiming to maintain the stock at or above a level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, and considering general principles of sustainability and mandatory environmental factors. The applicants challenged the lawfulness of the Minister's 2023 TAC decision by alleging that it is not based on the best available information and would fail to confront an urgent crisis in the marine environment of widespread kina barrens.ELI contended that the Minister, while purporting to address the problem, selected a response that would be "entirely ineffectual" and make no material difference to the destruction of kelp forests on the eastern side of the fishery. The second applicant, Dallas Williams on behalf of Ngāti Hau and Ngāti Kaharau Hapū ki Hokianga, pursued a separate ground of judicial review challenging the Ministry’s consultation process. They claimed that the consultation for the 2023 TAC decision fell well short of the requirements of tikanga and of Section 12(1)(b) of the Fisheries Act 1996

In its judgment of 14 February 2025, the Court found the Minister's 2023 TAC decision to be unlawful, and thus ELI's application for judicial review was successful. The Court found that, while s 9 of the Fisheries Act 1996 required the Minister, among other things, to exercise its powers in a way that ensured the biological diversity of the aquatic environment would be maintained and habitats of particular significance for fisheries management would be protected (para. 102), the Minister based her decision on advice that was not based on best available information and not capable of achieving that outcome (paras 103, 119). In addition, the Court found that the Minister failed to distinguish between recreational and commercial fishing, despite clear evidence that kina barrens correlated more strongly with areas of intense recreational fishing. By applying similar catch reductions to both sectors without assessing their respective ecological impacts, the Minister did not adequately consider more effective, targeted responses based on available information (paras. 113 and 114). With regards to these claims by the second applicants, the Court found that given its finding that the Minister’s decision was unlawful on other grounds, it was not necessary for it to express a final view on the adequacy of the IFF consultation the Ministry offered (para. 115).

This decision is particularly significant for biodiversity and has a substantial section 'Kelp, kina and crayfish' which details the ecological phenomenon known as a trophic cascade. This process explains how the overfishing of crayfish, a major predator of kina, leads to an explosion in kina populations. The increased kina numbers then cause wholesale destruction of kelp forests, creating "kina barrens". The Court's decision closely examined the downstream environmental effects of overfishing, specifically the devastating damage to kelp forests off the east coast of Northland. In its analysis, the Court applied the environmental principles outlined in s 9 of the Act. It highlighted the critical importance of protecting biological diversity of the aquatic environment and habitats of particular significance for fisheries management. It confirmed that the Act’s purpose means that utilization of fisheries resources may not jeopardize sustainability.

On 13 February 2025, the Oslo District Court (an ordinary court of first instance with general jurisdiction over civil, criminal cases, and claims challenging the validity of administrative decisions) issued its decision in Case No. 24-081980TVI-TOSL/04 (Stiftelsen WWF Verdens Naturfond v. the State (represented by the Ministry of Energy)). The case involved WWF's challenge to the validity of the Royal Resolution of 12 April 2024 (also called Opening Resolution), which opened an area of the Norwegian continental shelf for mineral activities. WWF asked the court to declare Royal Resolution invalid and to award costs.

The dispute centered on the content requirements for the opening-stage impact assessment under the Seabed Minerals Act (havbunnsmineralloven) § 2-2, and how those requirements should be interpreted consistently with the Norwegian Constitution § 112 and Norway's international law obligations. In addressing these issues, the Court engaged with domestic environmental-law principles, such as the statutory requirement for decisions to be based on scientific knowledge and precautionary principle in the Nature Diversity Act, as well as with international and EU sources, including the EU's Directive 2001/42/EC (Plandirektivet), the SEA Protocol to the Espoo Convention, UNCLOS Article 206, the OSPAR Convention, and the Aarhus Convention.

The case arose from the Government's decision to open an extensive area of the Norwegian and Greenland Seas for potential seabed mineral activities under a stepwise licensing approach (opening / survey / exploitation). The opening process, initiated in January 2021, involved public consultation and was supported by multiple background studies, including a report on landscape features, habitat types, and benthic ecosystems, alongside other supporting reports. WWF argued, inter alia, that the impact assessment did not meet the statutory requirements under the Seabed Minerals Act. It contended that the Opening Resolution was based on a deficient and uncertain factual basis, given the risk of serious environmental harm in poorly understood deep-sea ecosystems. The State maintained that the statutory framework allows for a stepwise licensing approach, that while the knowledge base was insufficient to permit extraction it was adequate to justify the initiation of exploration, and that neither § 2-2 of the Seabed Minerals Act, the Constitution § 112, nor Norway's international obligations rendered the Opening Resolution unlawful on this basis.

The Court concluded that the Opening Resolution was not invalid and accordingly dismissed WWF's claim (Section 4). It held that the high "safety-valve" threshold associated with the Constitution § 112 was not met in this case (Section 8.5). The Court determined that WWF's challenge based on alleged procedural defects in the impact-assessment process constituted a justiciable claim (Section 9). It further concluded that the Opening Resolution was not invalid due to any material factual error (Section 8.4), and that it could not be annulled on the ground that future seabed-mineral activities cannot be fully assessed at the opening stage, given the statute's stepwise licensing approach and later project-specific assessment requirements (Section 8.5). Finally, WWF was ordered to pay the State's costs in the amount of NOK 500,000 (Section 10).

The case is significant for biodiversity because it concerns the opening of extensive areas along the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, encompassing habitats from abyssal plains to submarine mountains (Section 1.2). The opening process involved compiling background knowledge, including a report on landscape features, habitat types and benthic ecosystems (Section 1.3). WWF argued that even exploration activities could cause significant and potentially irreversible biological harm – particularly if intrusive activities like core drilling altered subsurface warm-water flows near inactive thermal structures, affecting their unique ecosystems (Section 2). The Court analyzed the matter against the statutory, stepwise licensing approach, under which commercial extraction requires an approved extraction plan and a project-specific impact assessment, meaning biodiversity impacts are to be assessed with increasing specificity at each phase (Section 6). In assessing what can be addressed at the opening stage, the judgment explicitly noted that species and habitats in the study area may be unknown, and that this uncertainty informs the feasibility of strategic assessment (Section 8.5). Ultimately, the Court held that the strategic impact assessment for the Opening Resolution does not have to be "complete and reliable" in the absolute scientific sense urged by WWF (Section 8.5).

The original language: Norwegian

This is the cassation (secondary) decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (the highest judicial body for civil, administrative, and criminal cases) in the case concerning the obligation to take measures aimed at conservation of aquatic biological resources in the event of constructions of plants and conducting economic activities potentially causing harm to the environment. The case was originally initiated by the Prosecutor of the Kezhemsky District of the Krasnoyarsk Region against company “Boguchanskaya Hydroelectric Power Plant”. In 2012, the Boguchanskay HPP started its operation on the Angara River. In the technical documentation on its construction, there was a chapter envisaging specific compensatory measures — reproduction of valuable fish species via construction of spawning and rearing farms. But due to the failure to construct this farm, the Boguchanskaya HPP took several campaigns to release Siberian sturgeon fry into the Enisei River.

In 2023, the Prosecutor of the Kezhemsky District of the Krasnoyarsk Region filed a lawsuit against the JSC “Boguchanskaya HPP”. The Prosecutor requested the Court to impose an obligation on the Defendant to carry out the only possible and prescribed compensatory measures to remedy damage to aquatic biological resources — to construct a fish breeding plant in the Angara River basin. Additionally, the Prosecutor sought to recover damages caused in the amount of 2,333,770,104.50 rubles. The Kezhemsky District Court of the Krasnoyarsk Region dismissed the Prosecutor’s claims, stating that the adjustment to the technical project “Boguchanskaya HPP on the Angara River” did not contain a direct indication that the construction of a fish breeding plant was the only possible compensatory measure for remedying damage to aquatic biological resources and their habitat.

By the appeals decision of the Judicial Board for Civil Cases of the Court of the Krasnoyarsk Region, the decision of the court of first instance was overturned, and a new decision granted the Prosecutor's claims. The appellate court proceeded from the fact that JSC "Boguchanskaya HPP" was the client and developer of the hydraulic structures and currently operates this facility. Therefore the company is under the obligation to carry out measures to eliminate the consequences of the negative impact on the state of biological resources and their habitat. The Court also found the Prosecutor’s claim for compensation justified. The Judicial Chamber for Civil Cases of the Eighth General Jurisdiction Court of Cassation of 26.03.2024 upheld the appellate decision.

In 2024, JSC “Boguchanskaya HPP” filed the second cassation appeal, requesting the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to declare the appeals decision and cassational decision to be unlawful and to overturn them. The Judicial Chamber for Civil Cases of the Supreme Court established that the challenged judicial acts were adopted with significant violations of legal norms and cannot be upheld.

Based on the Federal Law No. 166-FZ of December 20, 2004 “On Fishery and Conservation of Aquatic Biological Resources” and the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 380 of April 29, 2013 “On the Approval of the Regulations on Measures for the Conservation of Aquatic Biological Resources and Their Habitats”, the Court found that artificial reproduction of fish stocks is one (and not the only) of the possible ways to compensate harm caused to the environment and aquatic ecosystems by economic activities. Restoration measures are to be elaborated taking into account availability of existing or under-construction production capacities and facilities for the artificial reproduction of aquatic biological resources, economic assessment of options for restoration, adequacy and suitability of planned activities. Considering the factual circumstances of the case, the Court declared that imposing an obligation to build a fish breeding plant in the absence of developed construction and technical documentation, without resolving the issue of allocating land and fish farming plots for these purposes, indicates that the judicial act was unenforceable and unlawful. Additionally, the release of young Siberian sturgeon into the Yenisei River was considered as an adequate measure to eliminate the consequences of the negative impact on the state of aquatic biological resources and their habitat in the form of artificial reproduction of aquatic biological resources.

The Judicial Chamber for Civil Cases of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has ruled to revoke the appeals decision of the Judicial Board for Civil Cases of the Court of the Krasnoyarsk Region of 02.10.2023 and the cassational decision of the Judicial Chamber for Civil Cases of the Eighth General Jurisdiction Court of Cassation of 26.03.2024 and to remand the case for a new trial to the court of appellate instance.

This case is important for biodiversity conservation for several reasons. First, it underlines several principles for determination of compensatory measures in case of causing harm to the environment. Among factors which are to be considered, the Court listed availability of facilities and capabilities, effectiveness, economic evaluation of different options for remediation. Second, the case confirms the principle that the primary objective of compensation is effective environmental recovery, which can be achieved through a wide range of alternative measures. Finally, the Court’s decision reinforces the need for enforceable judicial decisions, stressing that the imposition of construction duties on the plant without resolution of land issues, technical documentation and building permits made the appeal decision virtually unenforceable. Measures ordered by the court must be implemented in a practical way, otherwise they will not bring tangible benefits to biodiversity conservation.

Original language: Russian.

The Estonian Ornithological Society (Eesti Ornitoloogiaühing) lodged a cassation complaint in the Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme Court of Estonia (Riigikohus) (the highest court in the Estonian judicial system, which hears cassation appeals in administrative, civil, and criminal matters) against the judgment of the Tallinn Circuit Court of 19 October 2022. The Society sought the annulment of an environmental permit (keskkonnaluba) issued by the Environmental Board (Keskkonnaamet) on 23 July 2020 to OÜ Hiiu Turvas – the mining company (third party) – for peat extraction in the Elbu V peat production area in Pärnu County.

The applicable law in this case included the Environmental Code Act (KeÜS), the Earth's Crust Act (MaaPS), the Nature Conservation Act (LKS), the Administrative Procedure Act (HMS), the Constitution of Estonia (PS), as well as the EU Birds Directive (2009/147/EU) and the EU Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC).

OÜ Hiiu Turvas applied for a permit to extract peat on a 331.85-hectare plot within the Lavassaare peat deposit. The maximum annual extraction volume was 45 000 tonnes. The area in question is a bog ecosystem, partially classified as habitat type 7110* (Active raised bogs) under the Habitats Directive. This bog provides habitat for protected bird species under the Birds Directive and Estonian law, including the dunlin (niidurüdi, Category I) and the European golden plover (rüüt, Category III). The Estonian Ornithological Society argued that issuing the permit violated EU nature conservation law and national law. The Society claimed that the Environmental Board failed to adequately assess the significant negative impact of peat extraction on the protected habitat type 7110* and bird species, the cumulative impacts of the project, and the ineffectiveness of the proposed mitigation measure (construction of a peat dam). It also argued that the Board should have considered strategic climate and conservation policy documents and refused the permit due to the apparent wasteful use of natural resources (§ 52(1)(7) KeÜS), environmental risk (§ 52(1)(6) KeÜS), and conflict with national interests (§ 55(2)(10) MaaPS). The Environmental Board and OÜ Hiiu Turvas requested the dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the impact assessment was sufficient, the area was not part of the Natura 2000 network, and the mitigation measures were adequate.

In its decision of 14 March 2024, the Supreme Court granted the cassation complaint, annulled the decisions of the lower courts, and satisfied the Society's application, thereby annulling the Environmental Board's permit and appeal decision. The Court found that the Environmental Board and the lower courts had incorrectly and incompletely assessed the grounds for refusing the permit under § 52(1)(6) and (7) of the Environmental Code Act and § 55(2)(10) of the Earth's Crust Act. The Court also determined that the Environmental Board violated public participation requirements during the permitting procedure (by failing to publish a notice in a newspaper and to hold a public hearing), and it disagreed with the lower courts’ view that these procedural breaches were insignificant (§ 42–43).

The Supreme Court emphasized the state's constitutional duty to preserve the environment (Estonian Constitution § 5, 53; see § 19 of the decision) and noted that, in an environmental permitting process, the authority must consider the goals set out in national strategic documents on environmental protection even if those documents are not formally binding legal acts (§ 20). The Court referred to Estonia’s Climate Policy Framework and Nature Conservation Development Plan, which aim to avoid further drainage of natural peatlands and to prefer peat extraction on areas already degraded by drainage (§ 21). In its reasoning the Court relied on the principles of sustainable development (§21), the precautionary principle (§37, 39), and the ecosystem approach (§22). The Supreme Court concluded that the Environmental Board had failed to ascertain the cumulative impact of the project on the habitat type 7110* (whose conservation status in Estonia has been assessed as “unfavourable–inadequate”) and on the relevant bird populations, and thus had not determined whether the activity’s environmental effects would be significant either individually or in combination with other impacts (§ 37-38). The Court provided important guidance on interpreting the concepts of “environmental risk”, “apparent wasteful use of natural resources”, and “conflict with national interests” in the context of extracting natural resources from intact ecosystems, linking them to the long-term conservation of the habitat type (§39).

Original language: Estonian.

This cassation case concerns the challenge by Joint-stock company “Rosseti Tyumen” (JSC “Rosseti Tyumen”) of the requirement of the Tyumen Inter-Regional Environmental Public Prosecutor (Prosecutor) on imposing the obligation to equip power transmission lines with bird protection devices on the territory of the state complex nature reserve “Abalaksky Natural-Historical Complex”. Power lines are considered dangerous for birds that die due to short-circuit. The use of power lines without isolating bird protection devices leads to death and reduction in numbers of birds, including rare and endangered species.

In 2022, the Court of First Instance granted the Prosecutor’s motion and ruled that JSC “Rosseti Tyumen” is obliged to provide the power lines it operates with special bird protection devices. The Court also considered the enhanced obligations of the JSC “Rosseti Tyumen” to comply with environmental requirements since it runs its activities on the territory of the state complex nature reserve of regional importance “Abalaksky Natural-Historical Complex”.

The JSС “Rosseti Tyumen” challenged the decision of the Court of First Instance. The  Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the District Court. Supporting the conclusions on special legal regimes within nature reserves, it found that running of economic activities in such areas is accompanied with the obligation to observe and ensure the established special protection regimes in state nature sanctuaries and natural monuments, which include a prohibition or restriction of any activity that causes harm to natural complexes. Thus, the JSC “Rosseti Tyumen”, as a user of a land plot in the specified zone, is obligated to ensure the safety of the power transmission lines it operates, irrespective of the date of their construction, commissioning, or acceptance onto the balance sheet, since this obligation pertains not to property relations but to environmental ones and is continuous. These requirements are subject to fulfillment not only during the design and construction of power transmission lines but also during their operation.

In the cassation appeal, JSC “Rosseti Tyumen” requested annulment of both courts’ decisions. JSC “Rosseti Tyumen” claimed that its ownership rights to the electric grid complex arose prior to the adoption of the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 13.08.1996 №997 “The approval of the Requirements for preventing the death of objects of the animal world during the implementation of production processes, as well as during the operation of transport routes, pipelines, communication lines and power transmission lines” which established the obligation to equip power transmission lines with bird protection devices (Regulation №997), and therefore it is not applicable to the JSC “Rosseti Tymen” facilities. JSC “Rosseti Tyumen” also argued that the Prosecutor has not provided any evidence confirming that the alteration or deterioration of the habitat of wildlife objects and/or the death of such objects depend on the presence of an electric grid complex, not equipped with bird protection devices, within the territory of the nature reserve. No facts have been established indicating injury or death of birds, or the causation or potential occurrence of any other damage to wildlife due to the operation of the electric grid facilities within the territory of the nature sanctuary. JSC “Rosseti Tyumen” disagrees with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the fact that the operation of power transmission lines without special bird protection devices creates a threat of death and reduction in the population of birds, including rare and endangered species, is a commonly known fact not requiring proof.

The Seventh General Jurisdiction Court of Cassation uphold  the decisions of the Central District Court of the city of Tyumen (the Court of First Instance) and the Court of  Tyumen Region (the Court of Appeal), and declined the cassation complaint of the joint-stock company “Rosseti Tyumen”. The Court of Cassation confirmed that the status of nature reserve requires the persons running activities there to comply with the special legal regimes of the reserve. When conducting its operations, the JSС “Rosseti Tyumen” is obliged to take into account environmental regulations and take measures to restore ecosystems (as necessary), sustainable and rational management of nature resources. Concerning the argument on temporal application of the Regulation №997, the Court found that this Regulation applies not only to the construction of power lines, but also to their operation, therefore the JSC “Rosseti Tyumen” are obliged to install the bird protection devices on power transmission lines. The arguments on evidence of threat to birds and unjustified conclusions of the Court of Appeal that such mortality is a fact of common knowledge not requiring proof, do not constitute grounds for overturning the challenged judicial acts. Finally,  the Court confirmed that the safety requirements for operational power lines concerning wildlife aim to protect birds and prevent their future mortality. Pursuing this aim, the special regulations of the nature reserve impose on the defendant an obligation to ensure the safety of operational power transmission lines regardless of their construction date, commissioning, or inclusion in the balance sheet, since this obligation relates not to property but to environmental legal relations. These obligations are mostly of a continuous nature.

This case is significant for biodiversity conservation for several reasons. First, the Court of Cassation reinforced that environmental obligations, especially in the specially protected areas, are of continuous nature and not subject to time limits based on factors important in the property relationships (such as the date of construction of infrastructure). Second, the Court of Cassation upheld  the application by lower courts of the article Article 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation on a commonly known fact not requiring proof in relation to the threat posed to birds' power lines. This judgment emphasizes that the burden of proof does not always require specific evidence of past harm when there is a high and foreseeable likelihood of future harm. Finally, the Court emphasized the special importance of nature reserves and strict obligations of those who conduct their business there to comply with environmental regulations. When running economic activities in such areas, companies are required to take measures to prevent environmental degradation, ensure restoration of ecosystems and rational usage of nature resources, as well as ecological security.

Original language: Russian.

This appeal case concerns the challenge by Joint-stock company “Rosseti Tyumen” of the requirement of the Tyumen Inter-Regional Environmental Public Prosecutor on imposing the obligation to equip power transmission lines with bird protection devices on the territory of the state complex nature reserve “Abalaksky Natural-Historical Complex”.

In 2022, Tyumen Inter-Regional Environmental Public Prosecutor (Prosecutor) filed a lawsuit against the Joint-stock company “Rosseti Tyumen” due to the absence of special bird protection devices on the power lines belonging to the Joint-stock company “Rosseti Tyumen”, on the territory of the State complex nature reserve of regional importance “Abalaksky Natural-Historical Complex”. Power lines are considered dangerous for birds that die due to electrical contact with grounded metal supports - a bird sitting on the struts touches the live wire and thus causes short-circuit. The use of power lines without isolating bird protection devices leads to death and reduction in numbers of birds, including rare and endangered species. The Court of First Instance granted the Prosecutor’s request.

On appeal, the Joint-stock company “Rosseti Tyumen” requested for annulment of the decision of the Court of First Instance. The Appellant indicated, among other arguments, that neither the Federal Law of 24.04.1995 N 52-FZ “On Wildlife” nor paragraph 33 of the Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 13.08.1996 №997 on requirements for preventing the death of objects of the animal world during the implementation of production processes does not provide for extension of their applicability to the relations, arising prior to their entry into force. Additionally, the Joint-stock company “Rosseti Tyumen” claimed that the Prosecutor had not proved the fact of death and reduction in numbers of birds, including rare and endangered species, when using power lines without bird protection devices.

The Court of Appeal (the Court of Tyumen Region) ruled that the operation of the power lines belonging to Joint-stock company “Rosseti Tyumen” in the absence of special bird protection devices poses a threat to the death and decline of birds, including rare and endangered species, which, contrary to the arguments of the appeal, is a commonly known fact not requiring proof. The Court noted that any economic activities, even if it has indirect negative impact on the environment, are to be accompanied by actions aimed at environmental protection.

Considering that the appellant has power lines on the territory of the nature reserve, the Court proclaimed that the establishment of specially protected areas, including public nature reserves, demonstrates the importance of the area for the conservation of biodiversity, including rare, endangered and economically and scientifically valuable plants, animals and their habitats. This imposes on the owners and users of land located within the boundaries of such reserves the duties to respect and to ensure the established special protection regimes, including the prohibition or restriction of any activity that harms nature complexes. The Court found that in such circumstances, the Joint-Stock Company “Rosseti Tyumen” is obligated to ensure the safety of the power transmission lines it operates, irrespective of their date of construction, commissioning, or inclusion on the balance sheet, since this obligation pertains not to property relations but to environmental ones and is continuous in nature. Thus, the  Court of Tyumen Region confirmed the decision of the Central District Court of the city of Tyumen (the Court of First Instance) dated November 16, 2022 and rejected the appeal of the Joint Stock Company “Rosseti Tyumen”.

This case is significant for biodiversity conservation for several reasons. First, the Court of Appeal recognized that the Prosecutor is not required to prove that the lack of special bird protection devices creates a threat of mortality and population decline for birds, including rare and endangered species, since this fact qualifies as a commonly known fact. Second, both courts established that protected natural areas are significant for the conservation of biological diversity, which imposes on the owners and users of these land plots the duties to respect and ensure special protection regimes. Third, the special status of state nature sanctuaries imposes an obligation to ensure the safety of operated power transmission lines regardless of their date of construction, commissioning, and inclusion on the balance sheet, since this obligation pertains not to property relations but to environmental ones and is continuous in nature.

Original language: Russian.

The Environmental Law Initiative and Carmen Hetaraka on behalf of Te Uri o Hikihiki Hapū filed an application for judicial review of two decisions made by the Minister for Oceans and Fisheries (the Minister) concerning the total allowable catch (TAC) for red rock lobster in the Northland quota management area (CRA1) under the Fisheries Act 1996 (the TAC decisions). The applicable law in this case included the Fisheries Act 1996, which the Court interpreted in accordance with the New Zealand's international obligations relating to fishing, including United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Committee on Fisheries’ Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. The cases cited in this case included New Zealand Recreational Fishing Council Inc v Sanford Ltd  NZSC 54,  3 NZLR 438; CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General  1 NZLR 172 (CA); Auckland City Council v Minister of Transport  1 NZLR 264 (CA); Heretaunga Residents Association Inc v Hutt City Council HC Wellington CIV-2003-485-1158, 17 February 2004; Taiaroa v Minister of Justice HC Wellington CP99/94, 4 October 1994; Antons Trawling Company Ltd v Minister of Fisheries HC Wellington CIV-2007-485-2199, 22 February 2008; Northern Inshore Fisheries Company Ltd v Minister of Fisheries; New Zealand Federation of Commercial Fishermen Inc v Minister of Fisheries HC Wellington, CIV-2008-485-2016; and Trans-Tasman Resources Ltd v Taranaki-Whanganui Conservation Board  NZSC 127,  NZLR 801.

The Minister is responsible for the administration of the Fisheries Act 1996, which includes the management of fisheries under the quota management system. In this case, the application for judicial review concerns the Minister's two decisions related to the TAC for red rock lobster in CRA1. Specifically, the applicants challenged the lawfulness of the 2021/22 decision to retain the TAC at 203 tonnes and the 2022/23 decision to decrease it to 193 tonnes, by alleging they were not based on the best available information, relied on materially inaccurate advice, failed to consider adopting a precautionary approach and to ensure sustainability, and were inconsistent with the purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996.

In its judgment of 11 November 2022, the Court found the challenged decisions to be unlawful and directed the Minister to reconsider the 2022/23 decision. The Court found that the decisions were based on incomplete and misleading advice about the role an increase in crayfish abundance might play in addressing the loss of kelp forests in the CRA1 fishery (paras. 111 - 115) and that this failure meant the Minister failed to consider mandatory relevant considerations, including ensuring sustainability and complying with environmental principles and habitat for fishery management (paras 116-118). However, the Court did not uphold the claim that the Minister failed to provide for the cultural wellbeing or ensure the participation of Te Uri o Hikihiki Hapū, finding that this argument was not specifically pleaded and that the Minister had consulted tangata whenua through the Iwi Fisheries Forum.

This decision is particularly significant for biodiversity and has a substantial section dedicated to the scientific evidence (namely, "The scientific evidence") which details the ecological impacts of the Minister’s decision on the marine environment. The decline in rock lobster populations leads to an increase in kina, which in turn causes the loss of kelp forests and the formation of kina barrens—a chain reaction known as a "trophic cascade." This loss is ecologically damaging to surrounding coastal ecosystems, undermines fisheries productivity, threatens biodiversity, and reduces ocean carbon sequestration (para. 69). The Court's decision closely examined the adequacy and accuracy of the scientific advice provided to the Minister. In its analysis, the Court applied the "best available information" principle, the precautionary approach and an ecosystem approach in evaluating ecological risks. It highlighted the critical importance of protecting biological diversity of the aquatic environment and protecting habitat of particular significance for fisheries management. It confirmed that the purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996 creates an environmental bottom-line of sustainability which must be ensured.

This cassation case concerns the challenge by the Limited Liability Company "Selskhoztehnika" (LLC "Selskhoztehnika") and Lavrenko A.I. of the appeals decision of the Judicial Chamber for Civil Cases of the Court of Altai Region. LLC “Selskoztehnika” started deforestation on the leased land (Lavrenko A.I. is a lessor). The expert survey conducted by State agencies showed that rare and endangered species included in the Red Book of the Russian Federation and of the Altai Krai were presented in that area. Given that the land lot is located in a transitional zone from mountains to plains, the biotopes formed there were considered to be of high conservation value. The deforestation could lead to the destruction of their habitats and cause irreparable harm to the natural environment.

The Prosecutor of the Ust-Kalmansky District of the Altai Krai filed a lawsuit against LLC "Selskhoztehnika", seeking to declare the company's actions of cutting down trees and shrubs unlawful and to obtain an injunction to prevent further deforestation. By the decision of the Ust-Kalmansky District Court of the Altai Krai (the Court of First Instance) of 17.11.2021, the claims of the Prosecutor were dismissed based on the fact that the measures sought by it were indiscriminate in different types of forest. By the appeals decision of the Judicial Chamber for Civil Cases of the Court of Altai Region (the Court of Appeal) of 22.03.2022, the decision of the Court of First Instance was overturned, and a new decision was issued granting the Prosecutor's claims. LLC "Selskhoztehnika" was thereby ordered to cease all tree and shrub clearing work on the leased land. The Court of Appeal pointed out that, pursuant to Article 60(1) of Federal Law No. 7-FZ "On Environmental Protection" of 10.01.2002, plants, animals, and other organisms belonging to species listed in the Red Books are universally subject to withdrawal from economic use, and any activity leading to their reduction in the population or degrading their habitat is prohibited. Furthermore, the Court referenced the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which establishes that the fair use of components of biological diversity to meet the food, medical, recreational, aesthetic, and other needs of the Earth's growing population must be conducted in such a manner and at such a rate that do not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby preserving its capacity to meet the needs of present and future generations.

The LLC "Selskhoztehnika" and representative of the land lessor filed a cassation appeal requesting the cancellation of the judgment and upholding of the decision of the Court of First Instance. The appellants in cassation argued that the expert opinion on ecological composition of the area concerned was inadmissible as evidence and raised doubts that the appellate court incorrectly identified the legally significant circumstances of the case.

The Judicial Chamber for Civil Cases of the Eighth General Jurisdiction Court of Cassation ruled to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal, and to dismiss the cassation appeal. The Chamber found that the conclusions of the Court of Appeal were consistent with the case materials, the description and analysis of the evidence were sufficiently detailed to support the final decision to grant the claim, and the legal reasoning corresponded to the rules of law applicable to the disputed legal relations and the established factual circumstances of the case. Besides the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of national legislation and reference to the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Chamber also supported the previous instance’s conclusions on distribution of injunction towards activities across the whole leased area (and not only those parts which are the habitats of rare and endangered species), taking into account the migration of species.

This case is significant for biodiversity conservation for several reasons. First, it establishes that the presence of rare and endangered species, even if localized within a part of a larger land area, can justify a complete ban on economically beneficial activities across the entire territory when such activities can cause harm to those species and their habitats. The courts of appeal and cassation instances recognized the land as an integrated ecosystem, where the preservation of habitat integrity is paramount. Second, the decision underscores the proactive and preventive nature of environmental protection laws. The restriction was imposed not based on recorded damage, but on the proven risk of future harm, including habitat destruction and population decline. Third, the decision reaffirmed the principle that in cases considering the restriction, suspension or termination of activities carried out in violation of environmental laws, the courts must strike a balance between the needs of society to preserve a favourable environment and ensure environmental safety, on the one hand, and the resolution of socio-economic issues, on the other. In doing so, courts should take into account not only factors that ensure the normal functioning of people and organisations, but also the proportionality of the consequences of the termination (suspension, restriction) of activities to the damage to the environment that may occur as a result of both the continuation of such activities and their termination.

Original language: Russian.

This appeal concerns the challenge by the Regional Public Organization "Ecological Watch of Sakhalin" (the Public Organization) of the decision of the Court of the City of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, which found lawful and remained in force the decision of the Head of the Regional Autonomous Institution "Management of State Expertise of the Sakhalin Region" (the Institution) to approve the positive conclusion of the State expert review of the project documentation for a facility "Sport-Tourist Complex “'Gorny Vozdukh”".

The Head of the Institution approved the conclusion of the State expert review of the documentation prepared for construction of the "Sport-Tourist Complex “Gorny Vozdukh”". The project involved the construction of the “Park Road” in the city of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. The projected section of the road was located in immediate proximity to the natural reserve of regional significance “Population of Cardiocrinum (Lily) Glen” (Natural reserve). Within the construction zone there were rare plant species listed in the Red Book of the Russian Federation and in the Red Book of the Sakhalin Region.

The Public Organization filed a lawsuit with the Court of the City of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, claiming that the decision of the Head of the Institution was unlawful. The Public Organization argued that the project documentation for the "Park Road" facility did not comply with environmental protection requirements concerning the preservation of plant species listed in the Red Books of the Russian Federation and of the Sakhalin Region because the protected zone regime of the Natural reserve, established by Decree No. 59 of the Sakhalin Regional Administration of 07.03.2008, prohibited the construction of any roads and vehicular traffic on its territory. The realization of the project would lead to the destruction of a significant part of the population and a loss of its stability, which would affect the genetic structure of species on Sakhalin. The Court of the City of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk dismissed the claim, stating that the regional legislation allowed the removal of plant species listed in the Red Book of the Sakhalin Region in exceptional cases, when it is impossible and/or there are no alternatives for locating such projects outside the habitats of these plant species, provided they are transplanted to locations with environmental conditions matching their natural habitat and guaranteeing their further normal growth. Furthermore, the Court found that the construction work for the Park Road was conducted outside the boundaries of the specified protected territory of the Natural reserve.

On appeal, the Public Organization pursued the same arguments, but also noted that since several affected plant species are listed in the Red Book of the Russian Federation, the proper authority entitled to issue permits for their harvesting was the central office of the Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation and its territorial bodies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Court of the City of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Additionally, the Court pointed out that the Far Eastern Interregional Department of the Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resource Use had subsequently issued Permit No. 077 to the Autonomous Institution "Sport-Tourist Complex “Gorny Vozdukh”" on 26.05.2021 for the transportation of plant species listed in the Red Book of the Russian Federation with the mandatory condition that the transportation would be conducted under the supervision of Federal Service for Supervision of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation officials. Furthermore, the Court took into account the fact that no alternative routes for the linear facility within the construction area were available.

This case is significant for biodiversity conservation for several reasons. Firstly, it illustrates how the Court applied the fundamental principles of national policy on environmental protection in the Russian Federation (the most relevant among them, as applied, are the presumption of environmental hazard of economic and other activities activities; the mandatory state review of project and other documentation substantiating economic activities that may have a negative impact on the environment or pose a threat to the life, health, and property of citizens; and the priority of preserving natural ecological systems, landscapes, and natural complexes). Secondly, although the Court did not uphold the claims of the Public Organization, it carefully reviewed the project documentation and factual circumstances to ensure that the project’s implementation would not lead to the destruction of ecosystems or cause harm to plant species listed in the Red Books. Thirdly, the Court also emphasized that the removal of flora species included in the Red Books is permissible only in exceptional cases related to the placement of capital construction projects, when it is impossible and/or there are no alternative options for locating such projects outside the habitats of these plant species, provided that the plants are transplanted to areas with environmental conditions corresponding to their natural habitats and ensuring their further normal growth.

PDF-version of this decision is not available.

Original language: Russian.

In an urgent application[1] brought before High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) (a Court of general jurisdiction in civil, criminal, and administrative matters) by Mining and Environmental Justice Community Network of South Africa, GroundWork, Birdlife South Africa, Endangered Wildlife Trust, Federation for a Sustainable Environment, Association for Water And Rural Development and The Bench Marks Foundation sought interim relief to prevent the commencement of mining activities on properties that previously fell within the Mabola Protected Environment (MPE). The respondents included multiple governmental and local entities, but only two of them, Uthaka Energy (Pty) Ltd (Uthaka) and The Voice Community Representation Council (the Voice), opposed the application. The most active respondent in the proceedings was Uthaka. The respondents included multiple governmental and local entities, but only two of them, Uthaka Energy (Pty) Ltd (Uthaka) and The Voice Community Representation Council (the Voice), opposed the application. The most active respondent in the proceedings was Uthaka.

The applicable law in this case included: (i) the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, specifically section 24, which guarantees the right to an environment that is not harmful to health or well‑being, and requires the state to take reasonable measures to protect the environment for present and future generations; and the statutory framework, namely (ii) National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA); (iii) the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 (NEMBA); (iv) the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 (NEMPAA); and (v) the National Water Act 36 of 1998 (NWA). In addition, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) were invoked. The Court also applied the principles of sustainable development and the precautionary principle.

In January 2021, by way of a publication in the Provincial Gazette, the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Agriculture, Rural Development, Land and Environmental Affairs, Mpumalanga excluded certain properties, including portions of the farm Yzermyn 96 HT, from the MPE. The MPE comprises wetlands and grasslands largely classified as “Irreplaceable Critical Biodiversity Areas”. The applicants sought to review this decision and pointed to multiple other pending judicial reviews and appeals against key project authorisations, namely the environmental authorisation, the water use licence, and the rezoning approval. When the first respondent, Uthaka, proposed commencing mining operations on 24 March 2021, the Applicants applied for an urgent interim interdict to restrain any mining activity pending the finalisation of all these legal processes. The applicants argued that Uthaka should be restrained from commencing mining operations pending the finalisation of all related legal challenges. They contended that there was a reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm if mining were allowed to proceed. Uthaka opposed the relief, maintaining that it had obtained all the necessary statutory authorisations needed to commence mining operations. It further contended that, insofar as its mining operations may cause environmental disturbance, the effect thereof would be mitigated by the rehabilitation plans and other preventative measures in place. Finally, Uthaka, relying on the principle of sustainable development, argued that granting an interim order would result in the loss of profit and income and prevent job-creation.

The Court found that there was a well-grounded apprehension of harm to the environment with a real prospect of being irreversible (para. 8). The Court issued an interim order prohibiting all substantive mining operations on the relevant properties, while allowing only the specific activities of survey pegging and wetlands demarcation pegging (order, para. 2). The Court ordered that the interdict shall remain in force unless and until the final determination of the specific reviews and appeals listed in its order has taken place (order, para. 2.1).

The judgment is significant for biodiversity. The Court clarified that the principle of sustainable development, while applicable, demands heightened scrutiny in a protected environment (para. 6.12). The court explicitly treated the MPE’s wetlands and grasslands as critical biodiversity features, noting that they were largely classified as “Irreplaceable Critical Biodiversity Areas” (para. 6.12). The Court referenced the precautionary approach, stating that where there is a risk to a protected area without absolute scientific assurance about its manageability, the Court's duty is to err on the side of protection to prevent irreversible harm (paras. 6.20–6.22). Thus, the Court held that where there is a reasonable prospect that an excision from a protected environment may be reversed, the risk of damage to that environment should be avoided until certainty about the excision is obtained (para. 6.23). Furthermore, it referenced the State’s trustee obligations over protected areas under NEMPAA (para. 6.12).

[1] “Urgent application” is governed by Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court of South Africa, which permits a court to dispense with ordinary forms and time periods where circumstances render the matter urgent.

The text retains original spellings, including occasional typographical inconsistencies, to ensure faithful reproduction of the court’s judgment.

The applicants filed an application in the before the French Council of State to annul a 27 June 2019 ministerial order. This order, issued jointly by the Minister for Ecological Transition and Solidarity and the Minister for Agriculture and Food, authorised the experimental use of scaring measures to prevent brown bear (Ursus arctos) attacks on livestock in the Pyrenees. The applicable law in this case included the Constitution of France 1958, Council Directive 92/43/EEC of May 21, 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (the Habitats Directive), the Environmental Code, and the Code of Administrative Justice.

The legal dispute focused on whether the order met the strict conditions for derogation under the Habitats Directive. The brown bear (Ursus arctos) is a strictly protected species listed in Annex IV(a) of the Habitats Directive. The order provided two exemptions for disturbing brown bears for the protection of domestic herds and permitted two types of scaring measures: (1) simple scaring using sound, light, or olfactory methods, permitted where a herd had experienced at least one attack in the previous year or four over the previous two years; and (2) reinforced scaring using non-lethal gunfire, authorized only after simple scaring had been applied and a second attack occurred within a month, or from the first attack if four or more had occurred over the past two years.

The applicants challenged the order by arguing that, first, the order breached the precautionary principle enshrined under the French Environmental Charter as it authorized measures that posed uncertain risks to the viability of the brown bear population. Second, they contended that the conditions for derogation under Article L.411-2 of the Environmental Code were not met, as the required threshold of “significant damage” to livestock farming had not been sufficiently demonstrated. Third, they argued that the order failed to safeguard the conservation status of the brown bear, a species already in an unfavourable state in France, which is in breach of Article 16 of the Habitats Directive and corresponding national provisions. Further, the applicants asserted that less harmful alternatives had not been adequately considered, violating the principle that derogations can only be permitted when no other satisfactory solution exists under the Environmental Code.

In its decision of 4 February 2021, the Council of State rejected the plea of precautionary, finding that the risks cited did not fall within the category of uncertain or insufficiently understood threats that would invoke the precautionary principle. It found that the order was compliant with legal standard of significant damage, as it only authorised scaring in response to confirmed attacks that resulted in compensable harm. It held that if the conservation status of the species is unfavourable, such derogation measures may only be lawfully adopted if they do not undermine the maintenance of the species’ populations within their natural range and do not compromise the improvement of the species’ conservation status. It partially upheld the claim of maintenance of favorable conservation status by concluding that reinforced scaring measures (using non-lethal gunfire) lacked adequate safeguards to ensure they would not harm the bear population or hinder conservation efforts. Accordingly, the it annulled the words “two” and “reinforced scaring, using non-lethal shots” in the wordings of the order, and fined the State €2,000 to applicant.

This decision is particularly significant for brown bear conservation in France. It underscores those exceptions to strict species protection under the Habitat Directive, even to prevent significant damage to livestock, must not jeopardize the species’ maintenance or progress towards a favorable conservation status. The case confirmed that authorizing reinforced scaring measures without clear safeguards failed to meet these standards. It affirms the administrative role in enforcing the stringent requirements of the Habitats Directive and national law, requiring rigorous assessment of even experimental livestock protection measures.

This appellate case concerns the delisting of the Greater Yellowstone grizzly bear population from the list of threatened species, initiated by tribal and conservation groups seeking to reinstate federal protections. It arose following the Montana District Court’s order in Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 3d 999 (D. Mont. 2018), which remanded the 2017 delisting rule for further consideration, prompting the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The appellate Court applied the Endangered Species Act and extensively relied on the case-law, including Defenders of Wildlife v. Zinke, 849 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2017), Humane Society v. Zinke, 865 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir. 2017), Arizona Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2010). 

The grizzly bear, originally listed as a threatened species in 1975 due to significant population decline, had experienced notable recovery in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem after the adoption and implementation of a Grizzly Bear Recovery Plan in 1982. The FWS, citing this progress, issued a final rule in 2017 creating a distinct population segment (DPS) for the Yellowstone grizzly and delisting it from the threatened species list based on claimed population stability and sufficient regulatory mechanisms, including a 2016 Conservation Strategy agreed with the states of the Yellowstone region (Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming). The plaintiffs (in the original lawsuit filed in the District Court of Montana) challenged the delisting and sought its revocation.

In 2017, the District Court vacated and remanded the 2017 delisting rule due to three key deficiencies in the agency’s analysis. The Court found that FWS failed to sufficiently analyze how delisting the Yellowstone population would affect remaining. Regarding the lack of genetic diversity, the Court held that the FWS acted contrary to the best available science, arbitrarily and capriciously since the Yellowstone population was not threatened by low genetic diversity and by dropping prior commitments for translocation to maintain genetic health. Moreover, the Court found the dismissal of a recalibration commitment (a mechanism to adjust population estimates using updated methodologies) to be influenced by political pressure rather than scientific data, which violated the ESA. Challenging the Court’s order, the Government and intervenors, acting as defendants-appellants, argued that the FWS acted within its discretion and complied with the Endangered Species Act by only determining whether there is a sufficient remnant population to merit protection, instead on the comprehensive and full review under the Section 4(a) of the Endangered Species Act. The defendants-appellants further maintained that the agency had considered genetic concerns and reasonably concluded that active translocation of bears was not required. They accused the District Court of substituting its own judgment for the agency’s one on what regulatory mechanisms will maintain long term genetic health. Finally, intervenors (particularly states) appealed the order for inclusion of a commitment to recalibration of population estimators, which, as they argued, is unnecessary and speculative. Appellees argued that the Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction to review the order of the District Court because the order was not final, resulting in a remand to the FWS for further consideration. They also maintained that FWS challenged only the grounds for the District Court’s remand and not the remand itself and therefore lacked standing. On the merits, they urged the Court to affirm the District Court’s rulings and argued that the District Court did not require a full Section 4(a) analysis when used the term “comprehensive review.”

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld most of the District Court’s rulings. First, the Court affirmed the remand for further agency consideration, except it vacated the part requiring a comprehensive Endangered Species Act Section 4(a) review of the remnant population, on the grounds that the District Court incorrectly applied text of Section 4(c), because that section requires a full, five-factor threats analysis only when deciding to delist, not when reviewing the status of a species. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the FWS must determine on remand whether there is a sufficiently distinct and protectable remnant population, so that delisting will not further threaten its existence (section III.A). Second, the Appellate Court held that the FWS’s treatment of genetic diversity threats to the Yellowstone grizzly population was inadequate. The Court determined that the agency had not engaged with the best available science regarding the risks of genetic isolation and had failed to provide an enforceable mechanism to ensure an increase in population size and long-term genetic health. Third, the Court affirmed that the FWS’s decision to omit a commitment to recalibrate population estimates — if counting methodologies changed — was arbitrary. It noted that the agency had previously recognized the importance of such recalibration but omitted it from the Final Rule without sufficient justification. The Court found this shift in position to be influenced by external political pressure rather than scientific explanation.

This case is significant for biodiversity as the Court underscored the ecological consequences of delisting a distinct grizzly bear population without adequately evaluating impacts on remnant populations, long-term genetic diversity, or ecosystem health. It is one of the first federal appellate decisions to apply the Humane Society standard requiring assessment of the effects of DPS delisting on remnant species populations. The Court also identified deficiencies in the FWS’s use of scientific methods, holding that the agency acted contrary to the “best available science” by abandoning a commitment to calibrate population estimators necessary for assessing the species’ long-term viability and genetic health. The case emphasized the role of genetic connectivity in species viability and underscored the need for enforceable, science-driven monitoring commitments in biodiversity management.

The Regional Body of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Timber Industry of Arkhangelsk Oblast – Forest Management Department (Velsk Separate Subdivision) (the Department) lodged a cassation complaint in the Economic Disputes Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (the highest court for economic disputes), requesting that the decisions of the lower courts be overturned. The Department sought to recover 691 181 rubles from LLC "Trading House "Ferma" (TH "Ferma") as compensation for damage caused to forests. The applicable law in this case included Article 77(1) of the Federal Law "On Environmental Protection," Articles 15 and 1064 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Articles 91, 92 and 100 of the Forest Code of the Russian Federation (2006), Federal Law № 122‑FZ "On State Registration of Rights to Real Estate," Article 14 of Federal Law № 172‑FZ "On the Transfer of Lands or Land Plots from One Category to Another" (as amended by Federal Law № 280‑FZ), as well as the Supreme Court Plenum guidance on environmental liability and unlawful logging.

The case originated from the discovery of an illegal logging of forest stands (pine, aspen, spruce, alder, and birch, with a total volume of at least 123.56 m³) in a forest quarter leased to the peasant (farm) enterprise "Shonosha." An investigation revealed that the logging was carried out by a contractor, LLC "Ekoservis," engaged by LLC "Leko". The latter held a sublease for the land plot from the Respondent (TH "Ferma"). TH "Ferma" leased the plot from the municipal Committee for the Management of Municipal Property and Land Resources. In November 2017, the Department issued a demand for compensation to TH "Ferma", but the company did not pay voluntarily, leading to the lawsuit. In the cassation appeal, the Plaintiff, referring to the violation by the lower courts of the norms of substantive and procedural law, asked to cancel these judicial acts and adopt a new judicial act on the satisfaction of the claim.

In its ruling of 13 June 2019, the Supreme Court granted the cassation complaint, quashed the lower courts’ decisions, and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had incompletely established the facts and had misapplied the substantive norms governing compensation for environmental harm and the protection of forests. In particular, the Court emphasized that the refusal to initiate criminal proceedings does not preclude civil liability for environmental damage, and that logging carried out without the necessary forest-use titles and documentation constitutes unlawful felling. The evidentiary record, including cartographic materials submitted by Roslesinforg, indicated that the disputed cadastral parcel had been formed from a forest fund tract that was already under a valid forest lease (to the Shonosha farm) since 2008. Moreover, because this land parcel was placed on the cadastre after 1 January 2016, the special rule giving priority to EGRN data over the State Forest Register (GLR) did not apply to the situation – contrary to the assumption of the lower courts.

This ruling is significant for biodiversity conservation, particularly in strengthening the legal protection of forests. The Supreme Court expressly relied on Article 1 of the 2006 Forest Code, noting that forests have predominant ecological and social functions and that forest legislation is grounded in the principles of sustainable forest management and the conservation of biological diversity. It held that where century‑old forest stands grow on a publicly owned parcel recorded as agricultural land, the plot cannot be treated as agricultural land. Felling such stands cannot be regarded as land reclamation for agricultural use, and any felling may occur only with the requisite forest‑use titles and documentation, with logging in the absence of such titles constituting unlawful felling. The Court also confirmed that refusal to initiate a criminal case does not preclude the imposition of civil liability for environmental damage.

Original language: Russian.

The WWF South Africa filed a lawsuit in the High Court of South Africa against the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Minister, First Respondent) and the Deputy Director General: Fisheries Management Branch of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DDG, Second Respondent), to whom the Minister has delegated the power to set the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for marine living resources. The lawsuit concerned the lawfulness of the DDG’s determination of the TAC for West Coast Rock Lobster for the 2017/18 fishing season. The applicable law in this case included the Constitution of South Africa, the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA), and the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 (MLRA). The court also considered South Africa’s international obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention) and the Southern African Development Community Protocol on Fisheries (Protocol).

The Department annually determines a TAC for West Coast Rock Lobster. The TAC is recommended by the Scientific Working Group (SWG), which advises the Department based on an Operational Management Procedure (OMP) that incorporates updated resource monitoring data. The 2011 OMP included an exceptional circumstances provision, allowing for more drastic reductions of what TAC if monitoring data indicated that stock of what West Coast Rock Lobster abundance trends were worse than projected. In light of the severely depleted state of the resource in 2016, the SWG recommended a 34% reduction in the 2016/17 TAC, followed by a further 38% reduction in the 2017/18 TAC, down to 790 tons. However, the Department, particularly the DDG often set TACs higher than those recommended by the SWG. In 2017/18, the DDG set the TAC at the previous year’s level of 1924.08 tons, which was much higher than the recommended level, stating this decision was based on socio-economic considerations.

WWF South Africa sought a declaration that the TAC for the 2017/18 season was 790 tons, or alternatively, if found to be 1924.08 tons, that this determination be set aside as invalid, further requesting that future TACs be based on the best available science, comply with international obligations, and promote stock recovery. The Minister and the DDG argued that the 2017/18 TAC was valid at 1924.08 tons, and sought dismissal of the case on grounds that WWF failed to exhaust its internal right of appeal, filed too late, and that the season was already over. They also asserted that the DDG’s determination was rational and lawful. The South African Small-Scale Fisheries Collective, joining as amicus curiae, supported the relief claimed by WWF but also requested additional relief for small-scale fishers. The Сourt declined their request for additional relief and evidence.

In its judgment delivered on 26 September 2018, the Court found that the DDG’s TAC decision was inconsistent with the Constitution, NEMA, and MLRA and therefore was invalid. The Court held that the DDG failed to base her decision on the best available scientific evidence, which showed the stock was critically depleted at 1.9% of pristine levels, and instead gave undue weight to short-term socio-economic considerations (paras 85-88). This approach violated the constitutional principle of intergenerational equity (paras 90-94) and the statutory requirement of sustainable use of natural resources. The court further found that the DDG's decision was irrational and arbitrary, as it relied on unsubstantiated claims about the ineffectiveness of TAC reductions, speculative improvements in anti-poaching efforts, and dismissed the precautionary principle (paras 100-106, 117(e)(g)).

This judgment is particularly significant for biodiversity protection by setting aside a catch quota that would have further endangered a severely depleted species, the judgment affirms that conservation and sustainable use are not optional policy goals, but binding legal obligations. It highlights the importance of science-based, precautionary decision-making in protecting endangered species, and reinforces that short-term socio-economic considerations cannot justify actions that threaten long-term survival of vulnerable species and breach intergenerational equity.

The Non-Commercial Partnership "Sport-Hunting Club “Rumelko-Sporting”" (the Partnership) filed a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation alleging inconsistency of the Article 43(3) of the Federal Law "On Hunting and Conservation of Hunting Resources and on Amending Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation" (Federal Law “On Hunting and Conservation of Hunting Resources”) with the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Under Article 43(3) of the Federal Law “On Hunting and Conservation of Hunting Resources”, there is the obligation to implement measures for the protection of hunting resources from diseases in assigned hunting grounds for legal entities and individual entrepreneurs who have entered into hunting agreements. In 2014, the Governor of the Tver Region issued a decree to vaccinate all animals vulnerable to rabies. The Partnership was held liable for refusal to vaccinate hunting species within the area leased by it for hunting, due to the absence of medicine provided by the government agencies. In justifying their decisions, domestic courts referred to the fact that under Article 43(3) of the Federal Law “On Hunting and Conservation of Hunting Resources”, the obligation to vaccinate was imposed without any exemptions on persons who have entered into hunting agreements due to the general obligation to manage hunting resources. Furthermore, the Сourts rejected the applicant's arguments that the acquisition of vaccines for anti-epizootic measures should be financed from the federal budget. According to the Partnership, Article 43(3) of the Federal Law “On Hunting and Conservation of Hunting Resources” contradicts Articles 8, 19(1), 35(3), and 55(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation to the extent that it permits imposing the obligation to acquire veterinary medicinal products (vaccines) for anti-epizootic measures to protect hunting resources from diseases in allocated hunting grounds on private parties, thereby unreasonably relieving the state (and its agencies) of the burden of financing these publicly significant functions.

The Constitutional Court established the existence of contradictory legal provisions. Unlike Article 43(3) of the Federal Law “On Hunting and Conservation of Hunting Resources”, Article 3 of the Law of the Russian Federation of May 14, 1993, No. 4979-1 "On Veterinary Medicine" assigns the provision of medicinal products for anti-epizootic measures against contagious and other animal diseases to the powers of the Russian Federation, without establishing any exceptions. Consequently, it is presumed that even in the case of organizing and implementing such measures in allocated hunting grounds, the acquisition of necessary veterinary preparations (medicinal products) should be ensured at the expense of the federal budget.

The Court paid attention to the responsibility of States for recognizing the enduring value of biological diversity, the sustainable use of their biological resources, the in-situ conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats, and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings. The Convention on Biological Diversity, which forms an integral part of the Russian legal system by virtue of Article 15(4) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, specifically stipulates that the fair use of components of biological diversity to meet the food, health, recreational, aesthetic, and other needs of the Earth's growing population must be conducted in a manner and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs of present and future generations. Furthermore, based on the principles of ensuring sustainable existence and usage of wild species, support of activities aimed at conservation and protection of wild species and their habitats, priority of public environmental interests as principles of State policy, the Court found that it is the State’s primary, or general, responsibility to conduct any activities related to conservation of biodiversity, particularly hunting species, not of private bodies. The latter has specific obligations to ensure taking actions for hunting species and their habitats’ preservation within the hunting areas.

However, the Court found that there is no uniform interpretation of the Article 43(3) of the Federal Law “On Hunting and Conservation of Hunting Resources” because of the diverse and even contradictory practice of State bodies and courts. Given this, the Constitutional Court found Article 43(3) of the Federal Law “On Hunting and Conservation of Hunting Resources” unconstitutional to the extent the uncertainty of its provisions creates the possibility to make ambiguous decisions as to who is obliged to pay for vaccines for conducting anti-epizootic measures to protect hunting resources from diseases. Considering that annulment of this provision can cause negative impacts for protection of environment, the Court rules that before due amendment of the Federal Law concerned the acquisition of veterinary medicinal products for conducting anti-epizootic measures to protect hunting resources from diseases in allocated hunting grounds shall be carried out by state authorities at the expense of budgetary funds.

This case is significant for biodiversity conservation for several reasons. Firstly, it explicitly links the conservation of hunting resources (wild animal populations) and the control of their diseases to the constitutional and international obligations of the Russian Federation to preserve biological diversity. Secondly, by challenging the ambiguous legal norm, the case affirms that burdensome financial obligations for public-interest conservation functions, such as large-scale disease prevention in wildlife, cannot be arbitrarily imposed on private parties through unclear legislation. This prevents the state from shifting the core financial burden of its biodiversity conservation duties onto hunters, thereby ensuring that essential anti-epizootic measures are funded and carried out effectively. Finally, the Court reaffirmed the core principles of State policy of the Russian Federation in conservation of biodiversity and protection of the environment. They are the principle of priority of public environmental interests, the general responsibility of the State for organization and implementation of conservation measures, the constitutional duty to preserve the environment and ensure ecological safety, the need for a balance between economic activity and environmental protection, and the sustainable use and conservation of biological diversity.

Original language: Russian.

The Humane Society of the United States and other organizations brought suit (originally in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) against the Secretary of the Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), challenging the 2011 agency rule that designated the Western Great Lakes population of gray wolves as a Distinct Population Segment (DPS) and simultaneously delisted that DPS from the federal list of endangered and threatened wildlife under the Endangered Species Act. The Sportmen’s Alliance Foundation and several states intervened in support of the agency and filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, contesting the District Court’s vacatur of the delisting rule. The Court of Appeal applied the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the case law, including: Natural Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2007), Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985), Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 91–92, 94 (2002), Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2011), McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816, 821–822 (2011), Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001), Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

The gray wolf was originally listed as endangered throughout most of the United States. After several unsuccessful attempts to delist regional populations, with rules issued in 2003, 2007, and 2009 being vacated by courts, the FWS promulgated the 2011 Rule, designating and delisting the Western Great Lakes DPS. This delisting lifted federal protections for wolves in Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, among others, transferring regulatory authority to the states. The Humane Society filed a suit alleging that the 2011 Rule violated both the Endangered Species Act and the APA. The District Court concluded that the Endangered Species Act does not permit the Service to designate a segment only to immediately delist it and challenged the creation of the Western Great Lakes segment as it altered the original geographic boundaries of the Minnesota wolf population. The Court further held that the rule was arbitrary and capricious due to the Service’s failure to address large losses in the gray wolf’s historical range and to assess threats from disease, human-caused mortality, and the insufficiency of state regulations to protect wolves after delisting.

On appeal, the federal defendants and intervenors argued that the Endangered Species Act clearly authorized designating and delisting distinct population segments, that the FWS properly applied the discreteness and significance tests from its Segment Policy, that the term "range" referred only to current range rather than historical range, and the Act does not require the restoration of a species to its entire historical range. The Service then maintains that the agency had adequately considered threats such as disease and human-caused mortality and correctly concluded that those threats have not been of sufficient magnitude to stop the continuing growth of the wolf population. Further, the Court asserted that it adequately considered state management plans and for all six of the States with no wolf plans, the Service reasonably concluded that the deaths of any wolves that might enter those States would be so minimal as to pose no threat to the segment’s survival. The Humane Society countered that the Endangered Species Act prohibited designating a segment for the sole purpose of delisting it, prohibited this type of fragmented delisting that would abandon remnant populations and prohibited, that the FWS failed to analyze the status of wolves outside the designated segment, ignored the impacts of losing approximately 95% of the species' historical range, failed to adequately to explain why the wolf population’s combined mortality from humans and disease is not a continuing threat to the species’ existence, and to address the lack of adequate plan provisions or other protections for the gray wolves in the seven States that make up the Western Great Lakes area.

The Court examined three key issues. First, although after closely examining the wording of the Endangered Species Act the Court concluded that the Act permits designating DPS for the purpose of delisting it, the Court found that the Service failed to reasonably analyze or even address the consequences of carving out and delisting the DPS, leaving the remnant gray wolf population (outside the DPS) potentially unprotected and in regulatory limbo. The Court explained that the Endangered Species Act’s text and the Service’s own Segment Policy require the Service to look at the implications for both the segment and the remnant during the delisting, uplisting, or downlisting process. Second, regarding the definition of "range," the Court determined that while the Service’s interpretation as a current range is reasonable, it acted arbitrary and capricious by completely ignoring the consequences of the wolves having lost approximately 95% of their historical range.  The Courd elaborated that an adequate evaluation of the threats confronting the survival of a species within its current range requires looking at more than just the current moment in time. This failure to consider historical range loss rendered the decision inadequately reasoned. Second, regarding the definition of "range," the Court determined that while the Service’s interpretation as a current range is reasonable, it acted arbitrary and capricious by completely ignoring the consequences of the wolves having lost approximately 95% of their historical range.  The Courd elaborated that an adequate evaluation of the threats confronting the survival of a species within its current range requires looking at more than just the current moment in time. This failure to consider historical range loss rendered the decision inadequately reasoned. Third, the Court rejected challenges to the Service's analysis of specific threats, finding its examinations of disease, human-caused mortality, and state regulatory mechanisms to be supported by evidence and not arbitrary. Regarding disease and human-caused danger, the Court held that Service’s analysis was adequate since it was grounded in scientific literature, corroborated through peer review by a specialized veterinary pathologist and is supported by records. Furthermore, in relation to the state regulation, the Court brushed off District Court’s decision that Service failed to adequately address what it described as an “unregulated killing zone”. The Court noted that Minnesota Plan does not authorize the unregulated killing of any wolf at any time by any person, but rather regulated killing when specified factors are present. The Court also ruled that the Service’s decision to delist notwithstanding the lack of state plans in North and South Dakota, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, and Indiana also did not rise to the level of arbitrary-and-capricious decision-making, given the near non-existence of gray wolves within those jurisdictions.

The Court's reasoning is important for the biological diversity conservation since it has elaborated on the legal test for delisting species and considering scientific factors in making decision related to altering level of species protection. This decision became a precedent and was cited in several cases, including Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, No. 16-35866 (9th Cir. 2018) and Crow Indian Tribe v. United States, No. 18-36030 (9th Cir. 2020).

Beijing Chaoyang District Friends of Nature Environmental Research Center and the Guangdong Environmental Protection Foundation filed a case in the Qingyuan City Intermediate People’s Court of Guangdong Province against Guangdong Nanling Forest Scenic Spot Management Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Dongyangguang Industrial Development Co., Ltd., and the Guangdong Province Yuyang Forestry Bureau for their engagement in forest eco-tourism project development, operation, and management in the Nanling National Forest Park, which overlapped almost completely with the Nanling National Nature Reserve. This case was concluded through civil mediation, and the court’s mediation statement did not include legal reasoning or references to specific laws applied.

The defendants began road construction in October 2010 in the core area of the Nanling National Nature Reserve, resulting in the complete destruction of vegetation in the section from Laopeng Duan to Shikengling by 2012. On New Year's Day 2016, the defendants began hardening the road surface by paving at least 4 kilometers of sand-and-mud roads with cement. The plaintiff, Friends of Nature, claimed that the defendants’ conduct had “caused serious damage to the natural ecological environment of the core area of the national nature reserve, and would continue to aggravate the ecological damage.” The plaintiff, Guangdong Environmental Protection Foundation, asserted that the defendants’ tourism development and road construction lacked the necessary approvals from the State Council’s administrative departments, that the Nanling National Forest Park’s master plan contradicted the Nanling National Nature Reserve’s plan without approval by the State Forestry Administration or environmental impact assessment, and that the road construction also lacked permits and land use approval. The plaintiffs requested the Court to order the defendants to: "immediately stop all tourism project development activities in the core area and buffer area" inconsistent with protection; pay 5 million yuan for ecological environment restoration costs (to be supervised by the plaintiffs or local environmental protection department); jointly compensate 5 million yuan for loss of ecological environment service function; make a public report and apology in News; and bear the litigation expenses.

In its Civil Mediation Statement of First Instance dated 20 February 2017, the Qingyuan Intermediate People's Court of Guangdong Province facilitated a voluntary agreement. Guangdong Nanling Forest Scenic Spot Management Co., Ltd. agreed to publicly apologize for environmental damage caused by the Shikengkong Highway construction; immediately stop further construction on the Laopeng to Shikengkong highway in the Nanling National Nature Reserve; ensure the completed road is used only for forest fire prevention, resource protection, and ecological restoration, prohibiting future tourism development projects within the Nature Reserve; fund and implement ecological restoration, by compensating 5 million yuan for ecological restoration (already fulfilled) dedicated to restoring the damaged road and other ecological management in the reserve; implementing restoration work per the "Nanling National Forest Park Forest Highway (Laopeng Section) Slope Re-greening and Ecological Restoration (Periodic) Project Program" by Guangdong Forestry Investigation and Planning Institute, to be completed by 30 April 2019; conducting the restoration through public bidding and under the supervision by the plaintiffs, their supporters, and the public; reporting annually to the enforcement court and plaintiffs under Guangdong Provincial Forestry Bureau supervision; bearing restoration effect assessment costs and, if unmet, continuing restoration costs until the goal is achieved. Finally, the defendant paid plaintiffs and supporters litigation expenses totaling 6.5 million yuan, plus case handling and announcement fees.

This decision is a milestone for environmental and biodiversity protection in China. It addressed severe habitat damage in the core zone of a national nature reserve, caused by development activities that threatened endangered species through fragmentation and potential local extinction. Importantly, the Court required not only financial compensation but also the implementation of a supervised ecological restoration plan, alongside a public apology and a ban on incompatible tourism projects, setting a precedent for corporate and governmental accountability. As a civil mediation, the case illustrates the effectiveness of mediation in resolving complex environmental disputes and securing concrete restoration commitments, complementing punitive approaches. It also highlights the collaborative role of NGOs, legal support organizations, and the judiciary in safeguarding sensitive ecological areas.

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Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, acting as lawyers for the resident toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises and other cetaceans, together with the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), filed separate petitions—later consolidated—against Angelo T. Reyes, then Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE); Jose L. Atienza Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, then DENR Regional Director for Region VII and Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board; and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX). The petitions were lodged with the Supreme Court of the Philippines (SC), the nation’s highest judicial body, under Rule 65 and the special environmental remedy known as the Writ of Kalikasan.[1] It sought to annul Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) that authorised oil and gas exploration by JAPEX, which was approved through a presidential decree on the Tañon Strait. The Tañon Strait has been a protected seascape since 1998, and is the largest marine protected area in the Philippines, and is currently labelled as environmentally critical. The applicable law in this case included the Philippine Constitution of 1987 (Section 2, Article XII), the Local Government Code of 1991, the Rules of Civil Procedure of 1997, and Presidential Decrees. Additionally, important acts for the conservation of biodiversity were used, in particular the National Integrated Protected System Act of 1992 (NIPAS) (Section 14), Rules of Procedure of Environmental Cases of 2010, Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act of 2001, and the Fisheries (1998) and Mining Code (1995) of the Philippines.

SC-46, signed in 2004 between the Government and JAPEX, allowed the latter to conduct oil exploration. SC-46 was allowed through the Presidential Decree No.87, which was contested as unconstitutional. Seismic surveys (2005) and an exploratory well (2007) generated intense acoustic disturbance, reef damage, and reported 50-70 % declines in local fish catch. Although the parties mutually terminated SC-46 in 2008, petitioners — including fisherfolk and environmental lawyers acting as legal stewards for the resident whales and dolphins — pursued judicial review, alleging continuing constitutional and ecological violations. The Petitioners argued that SC-46 was null and void because it lacked (i) a law authorizing the contract, (ii) presidential approval, and (iii) transmittal to Congress as required by art. XII § 2; that no Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) or valid Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) preceded the project; and that irremediable harm to marine biodiversity, livelihoods, and the rights of future generations had already occurred. The respondents contended that the case was moot after termination, that the contract complied with Presidential Decree No.87, that petitioners (especially the marine mammals) lacked standing, and that no concrete proof of environmental damage existed.

On 21 April 2015, the Supreme Court unanimously granted the petitions. It rejected the respondents’ “mootness” defence, holding that the grave constitutional and environmental questions required adjudication. The Court decided on the Locus Standi question through the “citizen suit”. By referring to Rule 2 Section 5 of the Rules and Procedure of Environmental Cases, the Court affirmed citizens’ standing to sue as stewards of nature, while declining to confer independent legal personality on the marine mammals themselves. The Court found SC-46 null and void as it deemed that Presidential Decree No.87 failed to satisfy the 1987 Constitution’s three safeguards for natural-resource service contracts. The Court also underlined that protected-area status under the NIPAS Act demands the strictest scrutiny and places ultimate control of resource use in the hands of Congress.

This decision is significant for biodiversity as it concerns the protection of an environmentally critical area for marine biodiversity in the Philippines, requiring strict compliance with environmental regulations, specifically designed to safeguard such areas. It also exemplified that even presidential action cannot pardon breaches particularly related to protected areas “rich in biodiversity marine life, including endangered species of dolphins and whales”. While these protections were ignored through presidential action, the case proves that citizens can represent nature in the Philippines’ litigation. The government must still comply with regulations that they have signed, as otherwise they are threatened through the rights provided to Filipinos in their Constitutional right, as manifested in the “citizen suit” of the Rules and Procedures of Environmental Cases. It allows Filipino citizens to be more effective stewards of nature, allowing them to reinforce the lack of Environmental Impact Assessments or Environmental Compliance Certificates in operations on protected areas.

[1] Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases describes the Writ of Kalikasan in more detail

Chumlong Lemthongthai appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (the highest appellate court in South Africa) against the sentence imposed by the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg (the High Court). This was his second appeal, following his initial conviction on 52 counts by the Regional Court, Kempton Park, and the subsequent appeal to the High Court. The appellant, a Thai national, had been convicted for offences related to the illegal rhino horn trade.

The applicable law in this case included Section 80(1)(i) of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, and Section 57(1), read with Sections 101(1) and 102, of the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004. The Court also invoked the constitutional right to have the environment protected, as enshrined in Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) was also referenced.

The appellant fraudulently obtained 26 permits from the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) by falsely representing that the rhinos would be hunted for trophy purposes by professional hunters. The rhinos in question were surplus bulls that were destined to be shot by trophy hunters. The persons named on the permits did not participate in the hunts, which were supervised by department officials. Acting on behalf of a Thai company that traded in rhino horn, the appellant caused 26 rhinos to be shot and killed, and most of their horns were exported for the purpose of unlawful trade. To enable the export of rhino horn, the Appellant unlawfully and intentionally made improper use of customs documents. The name of the consignee and the country of destination was changed on the permits, contrary to the CITES. In his plea, the appellant stated that he was merely an agent for a Thai company and not its director, that the outfitters were not aware the hunters were a front for illegal export, and he apologised for his role. The State contended that the offences were more serious than if the appellant had been a poacher proper, and that the manipulation of the permit system called for a harsh sentence and a long period of imprisonment.

In its Judgement, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal against sentence, set aside the order of the court below, and substituted it (para. 23). It held that the High Court had misdirected itself by wrongly having regard to the existence of a rhino trading syndicate without evidence, by dividing counts 27 to 52 into arbitrary groups, and by imposing a sentence that was disproportionate (para. 21). The Court substituted the sentence as follows: a fine of R1 million or five years’ imprisonment for counts 1 to 26, and six months’ imprisonment for each of counts 27 to 52. The effective sentence was thus payment of a fine of R1 million plus a period of imprisonment of thirteen years, antedated to 9 July 2011, with an effective period of eighteen years’ imprisonment in default of payment of the fine (para. 23).

This Judgement is significant for biodiversity law as the Court grounded its reasoning in the constitutional right to have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations (para. 19). It distinguished this case from that of a conventional poacher by noting that the rhinos killed had been surplus bulls destined to be shot by trophy hunters (para. 17). The Court criticised the DEA for both allowing manipulation of the permit system and failing to provide adequate supervision (para. 18). Furthermore, it held that a non‑custodial sentence would send the wrong message, and found the sentence imposed by the High Court to be too severe, inducing a sense of shock, and disproportionate (paras. 18-21).

Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, alongside other petitioners generations yet unborn, into the Supreme Court of the Philippines. They filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan, under the Rules and Procedure for Environmental Cases (Part III, Rule 7) towards Scott H. Swift in his capacity as the US Commander of the fleet, alongside others for failing their obligations to protect the Tubbataha Reefs. Petitioners alleged a violation of their constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology under the 1987 Constitution (Article II, Section 16) of the Philippines and invoked, inter alia, provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), including arguments about waiver of state immunity.

Applicable law included the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC (Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases), particularly Rule 7 on the Writ of Kalikasan; R.A. No. 10067 (Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act of 2009); and the VFA. Jurisprudence cited and discussed included Oposa v. Factoran on intergenerational responsibility and standing, United States v. Judge Guinto and Garcia v. Chief of Staff on state immunity, and BAYAN v. Executive Secretary Zamora on the VFA’s treaty status.

The Tubbataha Reefs—inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site and protected under R.A. No. 10067—were central to the case. On 17 January 2013 the USS Guardian ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal within the Tubbataha Reefs; a U.S.-led salvage operation removed the last pieces by 30 March 2013. Petitioners alleged environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice inhabitants in multiple provinces and sought numerous directives, including institution of civil, administrative and criminal actions and rehabilitation measures. Philippine respondents argued, among others, that requests related to salvage had become fait accompli (moot), that the petition was defective, and that issues touching the VFA and U.S. responsibility were for the Executive through diplomatic channels.

The Supreme Court denied the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan to achieve the remedies desired in the case. As a preliminary matter, it found no dispute on petitioners’ legal standing, citing Oposa. However, it held that suits against the U.S. officials in their official capacities were, in substance, suits against the United States, thus barred by state immunity, and that any waiver under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction; a ruling on VFA criminal-jurisdiction provisions was premature in a Kalikasan petition. The Court emphasized that damages cannot be awarded in a Kalikasan proceeding and noted that compensation and reef rehabilitation should proceed via diplomatic channels; it also refused petitioners’ broader requests to review or invalidate parts of the VFA.

For the purposes of biodiversity, the decision documents significant harm to a globally important marine ecosystem yet underscores the procedural limits of the Writ of Kalikasan and the constraints posed by sovereign immunity when foreign state actors are involved. The Court acknowledged that protective and rehabilitative reliefs fall within the writ’s conceptual scope, but in this case it deferred to the Executive on compensation and remediation and denied the writ.

The Centre for Environmental Law, WWF-India, filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court of India in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 337 of 1995. The case was heard by the Supreme Court of India, a constitutional judicial organ with jurisdiction over public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution. The form of submission was a public interest litigation addressing the need for translocation of the endangered Asiatic Lion (Panthera leo persica) from the Gir Forest in Gujarat to Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary in Madhya Pradesh.

The applicable law in the case included: the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972; the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; the Biological Diversity Act, 2002; the Constitution of India (Articles 21, 48A and 51A(g)); and relevant international instruments, including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn Convention), and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The Court also referred to national policy frameworks such as the National Wildlife Action Plan 2002–2016, National Biodiversity Action Plan 2008, and the Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats Scheme (2009).

The case emerged from scientific findings by the Wildlife Institute of India (WII), which since the late 1980s had recommended establishing a second free-ranging population of the critically endangered Asiatic Lion, currently confined to a single habitat in the Gir Forest. A 1993 population and habitat analysis workshop identified Kuno Wildlife Sanctuary in Madhya Pradesh as the most suitable alternative habitat. Between 1996 and 2001, the Government of Madhya Pradesh, with central government support, relocated 24 villages to make the sanctuary suitable for reintroduction. Despite approval by the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) and expenditure of significant public funds, the Government of Gujarat objected to the translocation, asserting state-level ownership and concerns over prey density and disease risk. The Union Ministry of Environment and Forests also initiated a conflicting proposal to introduce African Cheetahs in Kuno prior to relocating lions. The applicant requested a direction to enforce the lion relocation project, while a separate interlocutory application (I.A. No. 3452 in W.P. (C) No. 202 of 1995) challenged the MoEF's cheetah introduction plan.

In its judgment of 15 April 2013, the Supreme Court allowed both applications. It held that no state has ownership over wildlife and that wild animals are the property of the nation (para. 45). The Court affirmed that the NBWL, as the apex statutory and scientific body constituted by the central government, has precedence over state-level wildlife boards (para. 50). The Court emphasized the ecological vulnerability of a single, inbred lion population in Gir and endorsed reintroduction to Kuno as an essential species recovery measure. It found that all necessary preparatory steps had been taken and ordered the MoEF to implement the translocation within six months, in accordance with IUCN guidelines and under expert supervision. It also quashed the MoEF decision to introduce African Cheetahs to Kuno as arbitrary, unscientific, and inconsistent with statutory requirements.

The case is highly significant for biodiversity as it establishes judicial endorsement of reintroduction and ex-situ conservation as valid recovery tools for endangered species. The judgment emphasized eco-centric reasoning and the "species best interest" standard (paras 40, 49). It underlined the legal and constitutional duty to protect biodiversity (paras 41-42) and reinforced the importance of scientifically supported habitat recovery, long-term genetic management, and application of national and international biodiversity frameworks (para. 51). The case also highlighted the need for exclusive parliamentary legislation to strengthen endangered species protection in India (para 63).

Due to the technical issues, the Source URL leads to the home page of the Supreme Court of India. To find the text of this case enter '[2013] 6 S.C.R. 757' into search engine.

The Bulga Milbrodale Progress Association Inc. lodged an objector appeal in the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales (NSWLEC a first national specialist environmental superior court in the world) against the administrative decision of the Minister for Planning and Infrastructure, through the Planning Assessment Commission of NSW (PAC), which had conditionally approved the extension of open-cut coal mining operations at Warkworth Mine. The applicable law in this case included the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995 (NSW), Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, and relevant provisions of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979.

Warkworth Mining Limited sought approval in 2010 under Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 to extend its existing open-cut coal mining operations spatially westward and temporally until 2031. This extension required clearing approximately 766 hectares of endangered ecological communities (EECs), specifically Warkworth Sands Woodland (WSW), Hunter Lowland Redgum Forest (HLRF), Central Hunter Grey Box-Ironbark Woodland (CHGBIW), and Central Hunter Ironbark-Spotted Gum-Grey Box Forest. Additionally, it involved significant landscape modifications including the removal of Saddleback Ridge, and the closure of Wallaby Scrub Road. The Bulga Milbrodale Progress Association Inc. opposed the Project, arguing it would result in significant and unacceptable impacts on biodiversity, particularly on endangered ecological communities, that were neither adequately avoided nor mitigated or compensated by the proposed offsets. They further contended the Project would cause substantial noise and dust emissions adversely impacting local residents, along with negative social, visual, and economic impacts.

In its decision of 15 April 2013, the Court upheld the appeal, disapproving the Minister’s decision and thus refusing Warkworth’s project application. The Court found that the Project would result in significant adverse impacts on biodiversity, particularly through the permanent loss of sizeable, irreplaceable, and high-quality areas of critically endangered WSW and CHGBIW, and the habitat of fauna, within the disturbance area. The offsets and compensatory measures proposed by Warkworth were deemed inadequate, failing to sufficiently compensate or mitigate these impacts. The Court also found that proposed noise criteria were inappropriate, mitigation measures insufficient, and economic analyses provided by Warkworth were inadequate as they did not fully account for environmental and social impacts.

This decision is particularly significant for biodiversity and has entire part of it (Part 3: Impacts on Biological Diversity) dedicated to the issue. Decision rigorously scrutinized the adequacy of offset measures and applied the precautionary principle, as well as intergenerational equity, and the conservation of biological diversity, and ecological integrity principles in evaluating ecological risks. It highlighted the critical importance of protecting endangered ecological communities and emphasized the necessity for stringent, evidence-based standards for environmental management in project assessments.

This case concerns the claim of the territorial-neighbourhood community of the small-numbered indigenous peoples "Tigr" (the "Tigr" Community) against the Government of the Russian Federation, challenging Government Resolution No. 490 of 30.06.2010, "On the Rates of Payment per Unit Area of Hunting Grounds upon Conclusion of Hunting Management Agreements without an Auction" (Resolution No. 490), which established a fee for concluding hunting management agreements for all hunting users in the Primorsky Krai.

The "Tigr" Community engages in traditional economic activities for the small-numbered indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East, such as hunting and hunting management. After the adoption of Resolution No. 490, which set a fee for all hunting users in the Primorsky Krai, the "Tigr" Community was forced to refuse to conclude a hunting management agreement due to an inability to pay. The "Tigr" Community argued that, given its right to free use of lands of various categories in places of traditional residence, established by Article 8(1) of Federal Law No. 82-FZ of 30.04.1999 "On Guarantees of the Rights of the Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation", the organization has the right to use hunting grounds free of charge and is not obliged to pay a fee for concluding a hunting management agreement. The Complaint argues that the Resolution No. 490 contradicts the cited legal norms and does not comply with article 8(2) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Furthermore, since Resolution No. 490 fails to account for the rights of small-numbered peoples to preserve their traditional way of life and the sustainable use of biological diversity in accordance with their customs, it does not comply with the provisions of Article 8(j), Article 10(c) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

The Government considered Resolution No. 490 to be lawful and not infringing upon the rights and legitimate interests of the small-numbered indigenous peoples and their communities. The Government stated that Resolution No. 490 does not apply to small-numbered indigenous peoples and their communities, as free hunting for personal consumption does not require the conclusion of hunting management agreements or the payment of the established fee.

The Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation found no grounds to declare Resolution No. 490 non-compliant with the legal norms cited by the claimant or violating the rights and legally protected interests of small-numbered peoples and their communities. The Court found that, based on Articles 12 and 19 of the Hunting Law, hunting carried out by small-numbered peoples and their communities for the purpose of maintaining their traditional way of life and traditional economic activities is classified as an independent type of hunting according to its designated purpose, and this activity is carried out without any permits and free of charge. Thus, for carrying out this type of hunting, the conclusion of a hunting management agreement and the payment of the fee established by Resolution No. 490 are not required. Consequently, Resolution No. 490 does not apply to small-numbered peoples and their communities engaged in hunting to maintain their traditional way of life and traditional economic activities within the volume of hunting resources necessary for personal consumption. Therefore, it does not violate the rights of small-numbered peoples and their communities provided for by the cited norms of international and national legislation, including the rights of the claimant, which was the basis for dismissing the claim.

This case is significant for biodiversity conservation for several reasons. First, it emphasizes the state's obligations to protect the knowledge and practices of indigenous peoples relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Second, the ruling defines the legal boundary between commercial hunting, which is subject to general rules, and traditional use of biological resources for subsistence, which is fully protected and exempt from fees, recognizing its intrinsic connection to sustainable development.

Original language: Russian.

Environmental Defence Canada, the Georgia Strait Alliance, Western Canada Wilderness Committee, and the David Suzuki Foundation – charities working for environmental protection – applied for judicial review in the Federal Court of Canada (a national court with jurisdiction, inter alia, over judicial review of federal authorities’ decisions) against the decision of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. The application was framed as a “test case”, i.e. to clarify the Minister’s interpretation of the Species at Risk Act, 2002, c. 29 (SARA), as reflected in the Final Recovery Strategy for the Nooksack Dace [1]. The Applicants argued that the Minister failed to comply with the mandatory content requirements in ss. 41(1)(c) and (c.1) of SARA, and expressly made no allegation of bad faith.

The applicable law included SARA and Federal Courts Act s. 18.1(3). The Court explained that SARA’s recovery planning scheme has two linked stages: (i) preparation of a recovery strategy (ss. 37-46), which provides baseline information about the biology and ecology of the species and a broad strategy to address threats, and (ii) preparation of action plans (ss. 47-55), which set out more detailed recovery “action” measures and include evaluation of socio-economic costs and benefits. The dispute concerned the mandatory recovery-strategy requirements in ss. 41(1)(c) and (c.1), including the obligation to identify critical habitat “to the extent possible, based on the best available information” and, where information is inadequate, to include a schedule of studies. The court also analysed SARA s.38 (Canada’s commitment to conserving biological diversity and the precautionary principle) as a mandatory interpretive principle applicable to recovery strategies.

The case concerned recovery planning for the Nooksack Dace, whose habitat is four freshwater streams in British Columbia’s Lower Mainland. The Recovery Strategy was due on 5 June 2006 (SARA s. 42(2)). For the purposes of this judicial review, the “decision under review” was treated as a composite of five sequential actions and the resulting content of the Final Recovery Strategy: the preparation of a Draft Proposed Recovery Strategy (June 2005); the departmental direction altering the draft’s critical-habitat content (June 21, 2006); a departmental recommendation (July 18, 2007); the subsequent approval that constituted the Minister’s decision (July 18, 2007); and the posting of the Final Recovery Strategy (July 23, 2007). The Applicants contended the Final Strategy was contrary to law because it did not identify any critical habitat as required by s.41(1)(c) and improperly ignored available reliable information. The record showed that when the draft strategy was posted, the Recovery Team’s map of critical habitat, a table of habitat-threatening activities, and related descriptions were removed. The Minister admitted in his submissions that he was required to identify critical habitat within the SARA timelines based on the best available information, and conceded that the June 2006 direction was unwarranted and fettered his discretion.

In its decision, the Court held that the application ultimately raised a question of statutory interpretation and found that the Minister acted contrary to the law intended by Parliament to protect the Nooksack Dace (para. 3). The Court held that the requirements of s. 41 are mandatory and found that the departmental direction and the Minister’s subsequent approval were actions contrary to law, resulting in a failure to meet s. 41(1)(c) in the Final Recovery Strategy (para. 40). It held that the Final Recovery Strategy’s statement that critical-habitat attributes were “defined but not mapped or designated” and that critical habitat would be designated later through the action planning process (with socio-economic analysis and consultation) was an error of law (paras. 21, 42). The Court also held that “habitat” (and therefore the identification of “critical habitat”) includes a location and its special identifiable physical and biological features (attributes) (paras. 58, 64). Pursuant to s. 18.1(3) of the Federal Courts Act, the Court issued a declaration that the Minister acted contrary to law; by agreement, each party bore its own costs (Order, paras. 1, 2).

This decision is relevant for biodiversity because the Court described the Nooksack Dace as the first endangered species in Canada to benefit from a comprehensive Federal Court interpretation of key elements of SARA (para. 1). The Court treated s. 38 as a mandatory interpretive principle reflecting the Government of Canada’s commitment to conserving biological diversity and the precautionary principle, including that measures to prevent the reduction or loss of the species “should not be postponed for a lack of full scientific certainty” (paras. 33-35). It also clarified that socio-economic costs are considered at the action-plan stage (SARA s. 49(1)(e)), rather than at the recovery-strategy stage (para. 37). The Court further accepted (without disagreement from the Minister) that SARA should be construed to conform to the values and principles of the Convention on Biological Diversity and that the Court should avoid interpretations that could put Canada in breach of its Convention obligations (paras. 38, 39).

[1] A small (<15 cm) stream-dwelling minnow.

The individual entrepreneur Buksha A.S. lodged an application in the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (the highest judicial body for civil, administrative, and criminal cases) against the Government of the Russian Federation (represented by the State Fisheries Committee), seeking to have declared invalid paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 4 and subparagraph “g” of Section 5 of Government Decree No. 704 of 20 November 2003 on quotas for the extraction (catch) of aquatic biological resources.

The applicant (an individual registered as an entrepreneur with two fishing vessels “Vetrovoy” and “Krutogorovo”) had applied for quota shares under the Decree, but his application was denied on the basis that he had no prior fishing rights. He contended that the Decree’s rule – allocating quota shares with priority to persons who had previously held such rights – created unlawful advantages for certain operators and unjustifiably restricted access for others, violating his rights and contravening higher norms of law. In particular, he argued that the contested provisions conflicted with the Constitution of the Russian Federation (notably Articles 7, 9, 42 and 58), Article 7(1) of Federal Law No. 948-1 of 22 March 1991 “On Competition and Limitation of Monopolistic Activity”, Article 11 of Federal Laws No. 187-FZ of 30 November 1995 (on the continental shelf), and Article 9 of Federal Laws No. 191-FZ of 17 December 1998 (on the exclusive economic zone). The Government of the Russian Federation (through officials of the State Committee on Fisheries) asked the Court to dismiss the challenge, arguing that the Decree was issued within the Government’s authority and did not contradict any federal law or the Constitution.

The Supreme Court denied the application, finding that the challenged provisions had been adopted by the competent authority and fully corresponded with the cited domestic and international biodiversity norms. The Court explained that any question about the Decree’s conformity to Federal Laws No. 191-FZ of 17 December 1998 and the Constitution of the Russian Federation was for the Constitutional Court to decide. The Court rejected the applicant’s claims under the Continental Shelf Law (187-FZ) and competition law (Law 948-1).

The Supreme Court’s decision makes clear that fisheries quota-setting is to be viewed through the lens of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use. The Supreme Court’s analysis began by recalling that under the Constitution the State must ensure a dignified life and free development of citizens (Art. 7) and that natural resources are to be used and protected as a basis of life (Art. 9), while every person has the right to a favorable environment (Art. 42) and the duty to preserve nature (Art. 58). Citing the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Art. 6(b) and 8(c)) the Court emphasized the obligation of each State to adopt measures for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. The Court noted that Article 16(2) of Federal Law No. 52-FZ of 24 April 1995 “On Wildlife” empowers the Government to establish controls for wildlife use, and that setting catch quotas is itself “a means of protecting these natural resources as one of the foundations of life and activities of the peoples of the Russian Federation”.  By upholding the Government’s quota scheme and stressing that quotas serve as a protective mechanism under Article 9 of the Constitution and the CBD’s conservation goals, the Court effectively aligned quota administration with environmental obligations.

The Court's decision was appealed to the Cassation Board of the Supreme Court, but the complaint was dismissed.

Original language: Russian.